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IN THE SUPREM-E COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES
UTAH POWER & LIGHT
COMP ANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
DAVID FRANK PATTERSON and
PEARL PATTERSON, his wife,
F. DAVID PATTERSON and
MARIE PATTERSON, his wife,
LK\iVIS B. PATTERSON and
RAM.ONA PATTERSON, his wife,
JACK D. PATTERSON and
JOAN PATTERSON,his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
12968

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves a determination of damages
incident to the exercise of the power of eminent domain
by Utah Power & Light Company.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the commencement of trial, the district judge
ruled that, with respect to the "Dix Place," the appe[.
lants were entitled to recover any severance damage~ '
shown to have been ~mstained. The appellants' expert
witness testified to a substantial severance damage.
However, the respondent's expert witness testified to no
severance damage based upon his instruction that the ;
appellants were not legally entitled to severance damage. Upon cross examination, the respondent's expert I
witness admitted that the appellants sustained severance
damage if legally permitted.
The district judge refused to strike the testimony
of respondent's expert witness on the ground that it was
based upon erroneous principles of law. The jury verdict '
included no severance damage to the "Dix Place." By
order dated June 7, 1972, the district judge denied ap·
pellants' motion for a new trial.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the issue of damages to the ,
"Dix Place" reversed and remanded for a new trial. All
other issues have been resolved.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case intially involved four tracts of land in
. h
ontiguous
Clinton, Davis County-three of w h ic were c
2

--(Tr. 9). Each of these four tracts was subject to a separate Right of vV ay Easement held by respondent Utah
Power & Light Company (R. 1-9, Ex. A-D). The easement on the "Dix Place" was granted in 1913 (R. 1-9,
Ex. A), and the others were issued at about that same
time. Each of these easements permitted Utah Power &
Light Company to erect subsequent transmission lines
within the described right of way upon the payment of
certain damages (R. 1-9, Ex. A-D). However, the damages required to be paid by each instrument differed
materially (R. 1-9, Ex. A-D).
The Right of Way Easement granted by the Dix
people contained a broader damage provision than the
other easements. It required Utah Power & Light Company and its predecessor " ... to save and keep the said
parties of the first part (Dix), and each of them, their
and each of their heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, harmless of and from all damages which they or
either of them, may suffer as a result of the exercise of
the right, privilege and authority herein granted wnd to
pay all damages which the said parties of the first part
(Dix) and each of them, their and each of their heirs,
executors, administrators, or assigns may suffer, from
the construction, erection, operation, maintenance, or repair of, or damage or injury by, any tower or towers,
... line or lines, or other thing placed on said premises
above described under the right, privilege and authority
herein granted, . . . ( R. 1-9, Ex. A) (Emphasis added) .
After considerable discussion between the court
and counsel at the commencement of trial, it was ruled
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that the Dix easement required the payment of "all d .
ages," including severance (Tr. 7). Damages on~~
o.ther three tracts were limited essentially to construe~
hon damage to crops and livestock, and specifically excluded severance damage (Tr. 5).
The testimony in this case reflects that the "Dix
Place" contained 80 acres (Tr. 9), and was used in connection with other tracts as part of a livestock fattening
operation (Tr. 11). No cattle were kept on the "Dix
Place" (Tr. 18) ; instead, the "Dix Place" was utilized
for the production of corn to be fed on another tract (Tr.
51). Through this tract Utah Power & Light Company
constructed a transmission line utilizing large steel
towers (Tr. 18).
The appellants called Haven J. Barlow as an expert valuation witness (Tr. 69) . He testified that the
"Dix Place" was in a transitional stage from agricultural
to residential use (Tr. 73), and that under either use,
the construction of the new transmission line had an adverse effect upon the property (Tr. 7 5). After giving
his reasons for this adverse effect, Mr. Barlow gave his
opinion as to the diminution in fair market value of the
Dix property. Mr. Barlow approached this severance
damage from the standpoint of both agricultural and
residential use (Tr. 79-80). In Mr. Barlow's opinion the
"Dix Place" had sustained a severance damage of
$13,000.00 (Tr. 81).
Mr. Barlow's testimony was substantiated by Lewis
Patterson, one of the property owners. Wh 1·1e Mr. Pat·
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tcrson gave no monetary amount as to the total severance
damages sustained, he did explain the impact to his
farming operation by the construction of the transmission line and towers (Tr. 35-46), and gave the annual
cost of curing the various problems (Tr. 45).
The respondent called Marcellus Palmer as an expert valuation witness (Palmer Tr. 2). Mr. Palmer testified that he had made a field investigation according to
certain instructions (Palmer Tr. 5) and had been advied by counsel as to the uses permitted of the Dix easement without the payment of damages (Palmer Tr. 10).
Mr. Palmer concluded that the property had not been
additionally burdened (Palmer Tr. 10 and 11). Upon
cross examination, Mr. Palmer admitted that substantial
severance damage would be sustained by the Pattersons
should the easement be intepreted to permit the recovery
of all damages (Palmer Tr. 22).
Appellants moved the court for the striking of all
Mr. Palmer's testimony insofar as it related to the Dix
property (Tr. 95). This motion was based upon the
ground that Mr. Palmer's testimony was premised upon
a legal assumption contrary to the ruling of the court
and the express wording of the 1913 easement (Tr. 95).
This motion was denied (Tr. 96).
The jury answered an interrogatory to the effect
that the "Dix Place" sustained no damage in its fair
market value ( R. 7 4) •
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S WIT.
NESS MARCELLUS PALMER WAS BASED
UPON LEGAL ASSUMPTIONS CONTRARY
TO THE RULINGS OF THE COURT, AND
SUCH TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN
STRICKEN AS MOVED BY THE DEFEND.
ANTS DURING TRIAL.
At the commencement of the trial, the court prop·
erly involved itself with the interpretation of the four
easements (Tr. 2). The parties substantially agreed as
to the interpretation of three of these easements (Tr. 4),
but the fourth, the Dix easement, presented an issue of
construction. This issue was clearly stated by the court
and counsel (Tr. 5 and 6):
THE COURT: And we need an interpretation of the
Dix one as to what "all damages" means?
MR. AX.LAND: Specifically if it includes severance
damages to the extent of the defendants allegations
of placing an additional burden upon that ground
by the construction of a second right-of-way, and
any resultant diminution in property value because
of that burden.
Plaintiff's counsel argued the position that the Dix
easement excluded severance damage (Tr. 3) , while de·
.
ent per·
fendants' counsel argued that the D ix easem
6

x

mitted the recovery of severance damage (Tr. 4) . At the
conclusion of counsel's argument, the Court made its
ruling interpreting the language of the Dix easement
(Tr. 7):

THE COURT: All right. My interpretation of the Dix
agreement is that the phrasing "all damages" opens
it up. It means, as stated, "all damages."
MR. AXLAND: Will the court then hear severance
damages, in addition?

THE COURT: I will in regard to the Dix easement.
MR. AXLAND: I would like the record to reflect an
objection to that holding.

THE COURT: Let it show that they have been argued
two hours on that same objection.
I think the special phrasing of the Dix one puts it in
a different category and that "all" means "all."
This ruling of the court was entirely proper since it
involved the interpretation of a document where the only
doubt as to its meaning arose from the language of the
parties and not from extrinsic matters. Such an interpretation from the four corners of a document is consistent
with the expressions of this Court in Ephraim Theatre
Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221
( 1958) , and with the general rule as stated in 53 Am.
J ur., Trial, Section 266:
"'Vhere a contract is to be construed by its terms
alone, it is the duty of the court to intepret it, but
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where its meaning is obscure and its const t'
d
d
h
'. .
. rue ton
.epen .s upon ot. er a?d extrms1c facts in connec.
hon ~1th what is written, the question of inter.
pretat10n should be submitted to the J. ury und
· t uctions.
r.
'er
proper ms
• • •,,
The issue of severance damages having been de.
cided by the court, it was not thereafter in issue for de.
termination by the jury. The issue remaining for resolu.
tion by the jury was the amount of severance damage
and not whether severance damage was legally per.
mitted.
Notwithstanding this ruling by the court, the plain.
tiff introduced testimony premised upon a contrary interpretation of the Dix easement. Mr. Marcellus Palmer
was called by the plaintiff as an expert valuation witness.
When asked on direct examination if he had made an
appraisal of the property, Mr. Palmer answered that he
had "made a field investigation and made some deter·
minations according to ... instruction~ ... " (Palmer Tr.
5). Mr. Palmer testified that he had been advised by
counsel as to the legal effect of the easement (Palmer
Tr. IO). Mr. Palmer then testified that the Dix parcel
had not been subjected to any additional burden or use
and therefore the market value of the remaining prop·
erty was unaffected (Palmer Tr. 10 and 11):
"A. First of all as to the reasons, we have an easement
here, and I have been advised by counsel that it is a
legal and legitimate easement, and it provided ~er·
tain uses, not use. As I understand it, it provides
certain uses that would travel along with the real
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property in that easement from then on, and in my
opinion the construction of a second power line
within the bounds of the easement did not create
anything new and different as to the remaining
property, the supporting properties along the side
of the easement, because it was already provided in
the easement. I see no additional uses there that
affects the marketability of the remaining property."
On cross examination Mr. Palmer was asked to
assume that the proper interpretation of the easement
permitted the recovery of all damages caused by the
placement of a second transmission line at such time as
that second line was installed (Palmer Tr. 22). Mr.
Palmer then answered in the affirmative that substantial
severance damage would result under such a legal interpretation.
"Q. But I am asking you to assume. Let's assume that
the interpretation of the language of the easement
on the Dix farm specified, aside from the construction damages, that the damages, all damages, caused
by the placement of the towers and the lines on this
second power line should be determined and paid
when that line goes in. Then it would; would it not,
be a case that you would have substantial severance
damages if that were the legal interpretation?

A. If that were the legal interpretation, and using your
assumption.

Q Yes.
9

"""'

A. Yes, that could be, depending on the legal interpre.
tation of the document.
Q. All right. Let's assume that that is the legal interpretation.

MR. AXLAND: If the court please, for the record
may I have a continuing objection based upon the
ruling of the court in chambers this morning on this
line of questioning?
THE COURT: I think you made your point this morning, yes.
MR. AXLAND: Well, yes.
THE COURT: You mean you want to object to this
based on what went on this morning to his line of
questioning at this time?
MR. AXLAND: Yes.
THE COURT: Yes, of course.

Q. (By Mr. Fuller) All right. Now, if we take that as·

sumption, Mr. Palmer, and assume that wehadone
tower line and an easement with nothing on it ex·
cept that, and then we were to be paid for the dam·
ages for the additional towers and lines that woula
constitute a severance situation; wouldn't it?

A. Oh, yes, it sure would."

From a study of the transcript it is clear that ~fr
Palmer premised his testimony on an erroneous principle
of law which was contrary to the ruling of the court. Mr
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Palmer freely stated that he had proceeded according to
instructions and that he had been advised by counsel as
to the legal effect of the Dix easement. Counsel's interpretation, as argued before the Court at the commencement of trial was that there had been no "loss to the defendants in this matter because of severance or the imposition of an additional burden ... " (R. 3). Likewise,
when asked on direct examination "whether or not the
creation of the second power transmission line in 1968
created an additional burden on the remaining ground
within the Dix parcel and therefore reduced the fair
market value of that remaining ground ... ," Mr. Palmer answered that in his opinion "the construction of a
second power line within the bounds of the easement did
not create anything new and different as to the remaining property ... " (Tr. 10).
Upon direct examination counsel put before his
witness the precise legal question which had already
been decided by the Court. The question asked was
"whether . . . the second power transmission line . . .
created an additional burden ... " (Tr. 10). This question was posed in complete disregard of the prior ruling
of the court. The court had ruled that severance damages
were compensable under the easement and that the defendants were entitled to "all damages" arising by reason of the construction of the second transmission line
(Tr. 7). The court's ruling, in effect, was that the construction of the second transmission line created an additional burden for which compensation could be rerovered. Certainly the judge would not have ruled that
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damages could be recovered if he had not recognized an
injury or additional burden. The injury or additional
bur~en i~ and was a ph,ysica~ reality. Counsel's attempt
to cucumvent the court s rulmg by speaking in tenns of
injury or burden instead of damage should not be coun.
tenanced by this Court. Injury is presumed by the very
recognition of damage compensation.
Mr. Palmer's "'field investigation" was not an appraisal at all; it was merely a recitation of counsel's instructions that no severance damages were required under an interpretation of the easement. This was conceded
on cross examination. There Mr. Palmer admitted that
substantial damages would result under a different legal
interpretation (Palmer Tr. 22). Mr. Palmer's testimony
did not go to the issue of the amount of severance damage; instead, it went to an issue which had been decided
by the court and taken from the jury.
Such testimony which does not tend to establish or
disprove a matter in issue is properly excluded as being
immaterial. In the words of McCormick on Evidence,
Section 152,

"If the evidence offered to prove a proposition
which is not a matter in issue nor probative of 3
matter in issue, the evidence is properly said to be
immaterial. . . ."
Such evidence being immaterial, it should have been
stricken by the court as moved by the defendants. The
n erro·
testimony given by Mr. Palmer was base d upon a
·
no t then k
neous legal assumption and went to an issue
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fore the Court. This Court indicated in State Road
Comm. v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347 (1968),
that an expert opinion on a matter not properly before
the court or manifesting palpable ignorance of the subject matter should be stricken. The law is similarly stated
in 88 C. J. S., Trial, Section 134:
"Accordingly, evidence may be stricken on motion ... where the evidence bears on an issue
which has been withdrawn or dismissed, ... "
In this case common sense would dictate that some
damage would occur by reason of the construction of a
transmission line and large steel towers. Under the trial
court's interpretation of the 1913 easement, the landowners were entitled to recover "all damages" (Tr. 7).
Plaintiffs appraiser obviously proceeded under an interpretation contrary to that made by the court.

POINT II.

THE JURY VERDICT, AS IT RELATED TO
THE "DIX PLACE," 'VAS NOT WITHIN THE
RANGE OF COMPETENT TESTIMONY PRESENTED AT TRIAL.
The testimony of Marcellus Palmer, having gone to
an issue which had been withdrawn, was immaterial, and
this testimony, having been premised upon an erroneous
understanding of law, was similarly incompetent.
Such incompetent testimony, whether stricken or
not, will not sustain a jury verdict. This principle of law,
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•
that. the verdict
must be within the range of com peen\
t
.
testllllony, is elementary and has been stated in numer.
ous ~ppellate decisions. This principle of law applies
particularly to condemnation cases where the range of
testimony from expert witnesses is often quite broad:
"Ordinarily, a verdict or award in a condemna.
tion case will be sustained if, and only if it is
within the range of the testimony of the a~ount
of the value or damages .... " 27 Am. Jur. 2d
Eminent Domain, Section 471.
'
In the Utah case of State Road Comm. v. Silliman
supra, the jury award of severance damage was outside
the range of testimony; except in that case it was exces·
sive. The highest figure of any witness was $12,487.50;
the jury awarded severance damages of $15,023.50. This
Court held that the trial judge had abused his discretion
in not granting a new trial:
I

"The instant case is a good illustration of the
principle that the verdict canot stand when it
clearly shows that it was given either under the
influence of passion or prejudice or under a Uick
of understanding of the law as it applies to sev·
erance damanges. (Emphasis added.)
In Pierson v. Commonwealth, 350 S. W. 2d 487,
489 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961), just as in the Silliman case,
the total award was within the range of testimony but
the severance item alone was not. In both cases the cowis
considered the error to have remained uncured by the
fact that the overall award was within the range of testi·
mony. In both cases the award of severance was held not
to be supported by the evidence. The Kentucky Courl
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quoted from 5 Nichou on Eminent Domain, Section
17.l (4):

"Where the amount of one or more of the items of
damage awarded in a condemnation case is demonstrably erroneous it is not legitimated by the
fact that the overall amount of the award is within the range of the testimony." (Citing authority).
In Garvin v. State Road Dept., 149 So. 2d 869, 871,
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), the condemnor's appraiser

premised his appraisal upon erroneous informationjust as in the instant case. In that case the state's appraiser had been instructed that certain gasoline tanks and
pumps did not belong to the defendant. The state's appraiser came in at $30,060.00, and he testified that such
figure included nothing for the gasoline tanks and
pumps. A defendant landowner testified that he owned
the tanks and pumps. This testimony was uncontroverted. The jury verdict was $30,060.00, the exact figure
testified to by the state's appraiser. In reversing and remanding that case, the court stated the following reason:
"It is our view that in the instant case the jury, in
adopting the exact figure testified to by the condemnor' s appraiser, specifically excluding any
compensation for the defendants' said tanks and
pumps, awarded no compensation for these items.
This being so, the defendants have not received
'just compensation.' "
The Garvin case and the instant case have several
similarities. In both cases the condemnor's appraiser
htified to certain erroneous information pursuant to
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instructions.
.
. .In both cases the award came in at the exact
figure testified to by the condemnor's appraiser. Be.
cause of the erroneous premise for the testimony in each
case, the landowners' respective evidence was left tin·
controverted by competent testimony. The verdicts were
then not within the range of testimony. Stated another
way, the jury in each case ignored credible uncontro.
verted evidence.
Several Utah cases have been concerned with the
propriety of disregarding credible uncontroverted evi.
dence. In Page v. Federal Security Ins. Co., 8 Utah2d
226, 332 P. 2d 666, 669 ( 1958) , this Court held that the
trier of the facts could not "arbitrarily disregard credible
uncontroverted evidence. . .. " In Jones v. California
Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P. 2d 640, 64!
(1952), this Court elaborated further:
"However, where facts are proved by uncontra·
dieted testimony of competent disinterested wit·
nesses and there is nothing inherently umeason·
able, nor any circumstance which would tend to
raise do but of its truth, it should be taken as estab·
lished. Refusal to do so is an arbitrary disre~ard
by the trier of the facts, ... " (Citing authority.)
Where the jury verdict is not within the range or
competent testimony, it becomes the duty of the trial
judge to grant a new trial. 27 Am. J ur. 2d, Eminenl
80
Domain, Section 448. Failure of the trial court to .
grant a new trial is an abuse of discretion as held by thii
Court in State Road Comm. v. Silliman, supra.

16

CONCLUSION
This Court has repeatedly referred in appellate decisions to its reluctance to reverse a judgment after the
parties have had their day in court. However, it should
be recognized that the making of a jury verdict does not
insure justice. This Court with its higher authority was
established for the very purpose of correcting errors in
the trial process-whether they be made by judge or
JUry.
The error here is obvious; it was created by the deliberate disregard of the court's ruling that "all damages"
were compensable. The trial judge's fond hopes, that the
verdict would generally satisfy the defendants and that
they would overlook the obvious error, have not materialized. In other words, the defendants have been denied
"just compensation."
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER
ORVAL C. HARRISON
15 East 4th South

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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